Definition 1. [Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, 2001] A coalition formation game is a pair G = (N, ( i ) i∈N ), where N is a finite set of players and for every i ∈ N , i is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on N i = {C ∈ 2 N : i ∈ C}. If C, D ∈ N i and C i D and D i C, then we write
Definition 2. [Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, 2001] A coalition structure Γ = {C 1 , . . . , C k } is a partition of N . The coalition containing a player i ∈ N is denoted Γ (i). Any subset of N is called a coalition.
That's a very minimal definition, and these most general hedonic games don't have many computationally useful properties. For that reason, several subclasses of hedonic games have been invented and studied. First though, let's look at stability.
The Core
If Mr Holt were assigning groups, instead of letting the kids form their own groups, then he might want a way to predict if a given partition will stick before he actually moves people around. "Will the students stay in their groups or will they form new ones?" There are many ways you can ask the question "Is this coalition formation stable?" Seven good ways are mentioned in [Nguyen, Rey, Rey, Rothe, and Schend, 2016] . One of the most important ways to ask the question (and the focus of the survey [Woeginger, 2013] ) is "Is this this coalition formation core stable?".
Definition 3. In a hedonic game G with a partition Γ , if there is a nonempty set C ⊆ N where ∀i ∈ C : C i Γ (i), then we say that C blocks Γ , or C is a blocking coalition in Γ . If Γ cannot be blocked, then it is called core stable. The set of core stable partitions for a game G is called the core of G.
Varieties of Hedonic Games
In the below paragraphs, n = |N | is the number of players, i is a player in N , and C, D ∈ N i are coalitions which contain i. [Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein, 2014] In fractional hedonic games, i assigns some real value v i (j) to every player j ∈ N . It's assumed that
Fractional Hedonic Games
A fractional hedonic game is called simple if ∀i, j ∈ N : v i (j) ∈ {0, 1} and is called symmetric if ∀i, j ∈ N : v i (j) = v j (i). Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein show that even in fractional hedonic games which are both simple and symmetric, the core is sometimes empty and that checking core emptiness is Σ p 2 -complete. [Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung, 2006] In both of these kinds of games, i splits the other players in N into a set of friends, F i , and a set of enemies, E i .
Friend and Enemy Oriented Hedonic Games
In friend-oriented games, i prefers coalitions with more friends and breaks ties by considering the number of enemies. In other words,
So if C has 8 of i's friends and 600 of i's enemies and D has 7 of i's friends and 0 of i's enemies, then i would still rather be in C.
In enemy-oriented games, i tries to minimize enemies and only considers friends to break a tie. In other words,
Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung show that the core is guaranteed to be non-empty in both kinds of games. However, finding a core stable partition is NP-hard in enemy-oriented games 2 but polynomial time in friend-oriented games.
Altruistic Hedonic Games
[Nguyen, Rey, Rey, Rothe, and Schend, 2016] As in friend and enemy oriented hedonic games, i divides the other players into friends, F i , and enemies, E i . The idea is that a player wouldn't want to be in a coalition C where his friends were miserable, even if C had all of his friends and none of his enemies.
Three levels of altruism are considered. Let avg(S) = x∈S x/|S| denote the average of a multiset of numbers. And, as above, the utilities u i are defined so that
In selfish-first altruistic games, a player cares most about his own happiness and uses his friends' preferences to break ties. 'Happiness' here means the friend-oriented score. This is distinct from friend-oriented games in that a tightly connected coalition C with 6 friends and 3 enemies is preferred to a sparse coalition D with 6 friends and 3 enemies, because i's friends in C are happier than i's friends in D.
In equal-treatment altruistic games, a player takes his and all his friends' opinions into account equally when evaluating a partition:
And in altruistic-treatment altruistic games (i.e., truly altruistic games), a player prefers coalitions where his friends are happy and breaks ties by considering his own happiness.
Nguyen, Rey, Rey, Rothe, and Schend show that selfish-first altruistic games always have an nonempty core. Whether equal-treatment altruistic games and truly altruistic games ever have empty cores are open questions. I suspect that the core is always nonempty in both games.
